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UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
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VS. 
DAVID FRANK PATTERSON and 
PEARL PATTERSON, his wife; 
F. DAVID PATTERSON and 
MARIE PATTERSON, his wife; 
LEWIS B. PATTERSON and 
RAMONA PATTERSON, his wife; 
JACK B. PATTERSON and 
JOAN PATTERSON, his wife, 
Defendants-Appel'lant.s. 
Case No. 
12968 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT 0}, 'THE CASE 
Appellants landowners appeal from a decision of 
the Second District Court of Davis County refusing 
to strike the testimony of respondent condemnor's ap· 
praiser and seek a new trial on the issues of severance 
damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
On March 17, 1970, the Honorable Edward Sheya 
entered a Memorandum Decision holding the 1913 
Easement granted by appellants' predecessors-in-interest 
2 
to be valid and ~n l\Iay 5, 19701 entered Vindings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law confirming to respondent 
a 150 foot right-of-way over and across appellants' 
property and confirming in respondent the right to 
erect an additional transmission line by paying such 
amounts as were "specified or determinable" to the then 
landowners. 
At trial on l\Iarch 17, 1972, appellants moved to 
strike the testimony of respondent's appraiser, claiming 
such testimony was based upon an enoneous legal as· 
sumption. The trial court denied the motion. After the 
jury returned its verdict denying severance damages to 
the "Dix" Parcel, appellants moved for a new trial 
on the issue of severance damages or, in the alternative, 
for addittur of $13,000.00. This latter motion was de· 
nied, the court finding the verdict to be within the 
reasonable range of testimony presented at trial. 
RELIEF SOUGH1.' ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the trial .court should be 
affirmed in all particulars and appellants' request for 
new trial be denied. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
. · _. terest 
On July 2 8, 1913, cert am predecessors-m Jil 
. f f right-of -way 
of appellants entered into a series o our 
1 C predecesso. 
agreements with the Utah Power ompany, foot 
of respondent, granting the Power Company a 150 
ii 
.y 
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ensernent for the construction, erection and mainten-
ance of electric transmission lines. Each of the agree-
ments provided that the Power Company could erect 
and maintain additional towers on the Easement by pay-
ing to the then landowner a stipulated amount at the 
time such tower or towers were erected. 
The particular right-of-way agreement which is the 
subject of this litigation applied to a portion of appel-
la11ts' property known as the "Dix" parcel and set forth 
the duties and obligations of the Power Company should 
iL exercise the right to construct additional towers. The 
specific language, pertinent herein, is as follows: 
(The Power Company) agrees at all times 
hereafter, to save and keep (appellants' prede-
cessors) and their heirs, harmless of and from 
all damages which they, or either of them, may 
suffer as a result of the exercise of the right, 
privilege and authority herein granted, and to 
pay all damages which (appellants' predeces-
sors) or their heirs may suffer from the con-
struction, erection, operation, maintenance or 
repair of, or damage or injury by any tower 
. . . lines placed on the premises above de-
scribed under the right, privilege and authority 
granted. ( R. 9, Ex. "A"). 
Respondent filed suit against appellants averring 
its intent to exercise the right given it in the July 28, 
1918 agreement and tendered to appellants the requisite 
arnount established in the easement agreement for the 
4 
erection of two towers on the "Dix" 1>arcel · tJ1' t d • ' , ts en er 
was ref used. ~ R. 4). The parties stipulated certain 
facts surround.mg the creation of the easements (R. 
30-34). On .March 17, 1970, the Honorable Edwara 
Shey a, sitting by invitation, issued a Memorandum De-
cision holding each of the easements legal, valid ano 
binding upon the parties in all respects. (R. 29). On 
.May 5, 1970, Judge Sheya entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law providing in pertinent part: 
Findings of' lj..,act para. 9. That the grant.ors 
in said 1~~asemc11ts (Bx. "A" through "K", 
inclusive) intended to and did grant to plain· 
tiff an expandable easement within the scope 
of the 150 foot right of way conveyed by which 
plaintiff was given a present right to construct 
one or more structures and the further right, 
upon making future additional payment in 
amounts specified, to construct such additional 
structures as it desired. 
Conclusions of Law para. 8. That upon pay· 
ment of the appropriate additional amounts to 
defendants, as specified and/ or determinable 
in the easements, a Decree shall be issued quiet· 
ing plaintiff's title to said Easement.s and ~·e· 
straining defendants from interfermg w1~h 
plaintiffs exercise of its rights under said 
Easements. ( R. 47) 
. . d nsel met On the mornmg of trial, the court an cou . 
. h . f law mvolv· 
t o discuss among other thmgs, t e issues o ' "D' "Ease-ed in J udo-e Sheya's interpretation of the ix . 
o 1 d "''1 . terpretatllll ment. Judge Ronald 0. llydc rue ' .1_,. Y 10 
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of the Dix Agreement is that the phrasing 'all damages' 
opens it up. It means, as stated, 'all damages'." {T., p. 
7) .1 Counsel for respondent queried as to the Court's 
receiving evidence on the issue of severance damages 
and was advised that the court would do so on the "Dix" 
par<'el. ( T,. pg. 7) Respondent's counsel objected to 
that niling. 
On direct examination of respondent's appraiser, 
l\fr. Marcellus Palmer, counsel framed a question as to 
whether the erection of the second power transmission 
line, which was constructed in 1968, within the 150 foot 
easement crente<l an additional burden on the remain-
ing ground withjn the "Dix" parcel. Mr. Palmer testi-
fied: 
First of all as to the reasons, we have an ease-
ment here, and I have been advised by counsel 
that it is a legal and legitimate easement, and 
it provided certain uses, not use. As I under-
stand it. it provides certain uses that would 
travel along with the real property in the ease-
ment from then on, and in my opinion the con-
struction of a second power line within the 
bounds of the easement did not create anything 
new and different as to the remaining prop-
erty, the supporting properties along the sides 
of the easement, because it was already pro-
vided in the easement. I sec no additional uses 
---
1The portion of transcript containing testimony by Mr. P~tterson 
and Mr. Barlow will he denominated "T,"; the transcript con· 
taining testimony of Mr. Palmer will be denominated ''T2" • 
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there that affects the marketability of the . . • re-
mammg property. ( T2. p. 10-11). 
On cross-examination, counsel for appellants en-
gaged in the following dialogue with .Mr. Palmer: 
Q. Now, if we assume further that in the 
easement that was drafted in 1913 there was a 
provision that the damages, if any, to this ad-
ditional strip affected by the towers and the 
lines was to be determined in 1968 when the 
line was placed there, would you say then that 
there should be no damages assigned to that 
Dix field? 
A. I think so. I see no change in the physical 
facts. There was 150 feet easement that was 
taken, knowing and specifying within the 
writing of it that there would be lines built on 
it. There is nothing different here. It is just 
sort of carrying out what is anticipated. (T2. 
p. 21) 
and further: 
Q. (By l\Ir. J:<'uller). All right. Now, if 
we take that assumption, l\fr. Palmer, and as· 
sume that we had one tower line and an ease-
ment with nothing on it except that, and then 
we were to be paid for the damages for th~ 
additional towers and lines, that would constl· 
. d ' 't? tute a severance , 1 ia lion; woul n t I · 
A. Oh, yes, it sure would. 
Q. And that would affect not only the re-
7 
mainder of the easement area but possibly 
could affect the adjoining land? 
A. Yes, depending on how it was worded. 
Q. Yes. Have you any opinion as to the 
amount of such severance damages under that 
condition, or have you had illlY opportunity to 
study it? 
A. '""ell, I studied the whole property with 
that thing in mind, and I have given y<ou my 
determination. ( T2. p. 23) 
Appellants subsequently called their appraiser, Mr. 
Haven J. Barlow, and elicited testimony indicating sev-
erance damages on the "Dix" parcel of $13,000. At the 
conclusion of l\'Ir. Barlow's testimony, appellants' coun-
sel moved to strike the testimony of respondent's ap-
praiser alleging that such testimony was premised on n 
faulty and erroneous legal assumption. After hearing 
argument, the trial court denied the Motion. (T. p. 96). 
At the conclusion of appellants' presentation, the 
court instructed the jury that the burden of proving 
value of the property being acquired by respondent. 
and the burden of proving damages to the property 
that remain, if any, are burdens which the law placed 
upon appellants and that such burden must be estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence. (R. 56) • 
The court instructed specifically as to the "Dix" parcel: 
·with respect to the "Dix place", containing 
80 acres of land, vou are instructed that the 
8 
~ourt has ruled ~s a matter of law that de-
f en<lants are entitled to damages r It' . . . . · esu mg 
fro.m construction achv1hes; and, in addition 
def ernlants are also entitled to recover ti ' 
l 'f ie ~ amages, I any, to that piece of land result-
mg from the dimunition in its fair market 
Yalue by reason of the erection of the towers 
and transmission lines across the tract. This 
ruling of the Court has been predicated upon 
the language of the 1913 easement which 
leaves open the additional element of damages 
to the "Dix Place" itself at such time as the 
additional towers and transmission lines should 
be installed. ( R. 57) . 
The Court then instructed the jury regarding opinioo 
evidence: 
You should consider such expert. opinion and 
should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. 
You are not hound, however, by such an opin· 
ion. Give it the weight to which you deem it en· 
titled whether that be great or slight, and you 
may reject it if, in your judgment, .the reasons 
given for it are unsound. (R. 63). 
The jury returned special interrogatories and foundnij 
severance damage to the "Dix" parcel. ( R. 7 4) · 
Appellants filed a Motion for New Trial, or in~ 
Alternative for an A<lditur, of $13,000.00. This Motio~ 
was briefed and argued; on June 7, 1972, Judge Hyoi 
denied the Motion having found the verdict to have~ 
· sented 3, 
within the reasonable range of testimony pre 
trial. ( R. 92) . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY D~ 
NIED APPELLANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE TES1T:UONY OF RESPONDENT'S AP-
PRAISER. 
Appellants contend that the testimony of respon-
dent's appraiser, l\Ir. J\Iarcellus Palmer, should have 
been stricken by the trial court because "it was based 
upon an erroneous legal assumption". (Appellants' 
llrief, page 12) . A review of the record indicates, with-
out doubt, the correctness of the trial court's refusal so 
to strike. Prior to trial, counsel and the Court discussed 
at some length the issues to be submitted to the trier 
of fact. One was the issue of severance damages---dam-
ages to the remaining ground caused by the construction 
of the public facility. 
Respondent argued that the only damages to which 
appellants were entitled were on-premises damages oc-
casioned by construction activities and specifically de-
nied that there had been any loss or damage to appel-
lants hy reason of the imposition of the second power 
transmission line. ( T., p. 3). Appellants contended the 
"Dix" parcel must be considered separately and that 
severance damages could be shown thereon. The Court 
ruled that it would hear severance damages as to the 
"Dix" parcel. Based upon this ruling, to which respon-
10 
dent strenuously ohjeeted, the appraiser called h' 
spondent was specifically asked his opinion as to wh!t~: 
there had been a severance damage in the f f . . orm o au 
additional burden created by the constmction of the 
second power transmission line in 1968 and, if he found 
such a burden, whether the fair market value of appe]. 
lant's propery had been reduced thereby. Mr. Palmer 
categorically denied the existence of any severance 
damage: 
First of all as to the reasons, we have an ease-
ment here, and I have been advised hv counsel 
that it is a legal and legitimate ease~ent and 
it provided certain uses, not use. As I under-
stand it, it provides certain uses that would 
travel along with the real property in that 
easement from then on, and in my opinion the 
construction of a second power line within the 
bounds of the easement did not create any-
thing new and different as to the remaining 
property, the supporting properties along the 
sides of the easement, because it was already 
provided in the easement. I see no additional 
uses there that affects the marketability of the 
remaining property. (T2. p. 10-11) 
On cross-examination counsel for appellants at· 
tempted to discredit l\lr. Palmer's testimony and ~u~ 
jected him to a thorough and comprehensive exaIDJil3• 
- f h · · · C unsel o~ tion concerning the bases o is opm1on. o 
tained a statement from Mr. Palmer that und~r th; 
facts of this case and considering the interpretationo 
the easement given by Judge Hyde, a potential sev· 
11 
erance situation did exist. Counsel then queried, "Have 
you any opinion as to the amount of such severance 
damage under that condition, or have you had any op-
portm1ity to study itl (T2. p. 23) Mr. Palmer respond-
ed, "\V ell, I studied the whole property with that thing 
in mind, and I have given you my determination". ( T2. 
p. 23). Counsel for appellant next reviewed with Mr. 
Palmer the items of damages which appellants contend-
ed were proximately caused by the imposition of the 
second line but was unable to weaken Mr. Palmer's 
position that there had been no severance damage. 
It is incredible that appelJants attempt to argue 
that l\Ir. Palmer's testimony was based on an erroneous 
legal assumption when their counsel specfically framed 
a question to l\lr. Palmer on all fours with the trial 
court's interpretation of the damage provision and was 
informed that, in the witness's opinion, there was no 
such damage. Appellants' argument leaves one to 
suspect that the real difficulty with Mr. Palmer's testi-
mony from appellants' point of view is that his appraisal 
varied from appellants'. This is not a valid objection to 
competency of evidence. 'Vhatever deficiencies or un-
soundness which may have existed in this testimony do 
not go to its competency, but to its weight and credibil-
ity which was for the jury to pass upon. Brereton v. 
Di,ron, 20 Utah 2d 64, 483 P.2d 8 (1967). 
If appellants' counsel was of the opinion that Mr. 
P11lmer had made a gross err or was so muddled in his 
thinking as to be unable to comprehend the issue of 
-
12 
severance damacre to the "Dix" Parcel t) . 
• !:"> • ' ie opportunity 
to develop this pomt was presented him on er · . . oss-exam. 
mation. The fact that counsel chose not to do so k 
f · t l f' C 1 · spea 1 . or I se . ,onnse dICl not have one additional question 
m regard to Mr. Palmer's assumptions after the witn . .. esi 
testif 1ed that he lm(l fully coHsidered the issue and coula 
find no severance damages. As was pointed out bu th' 
J I! 
Court in Board of Education of Salt Lal,·c City v. Both· 
'Well and ,'-,'rcancr Co., 16 Utah 2d 341, 400 P.2d 56! 
( 1965) it is the duty of the opponent to prove on cros1-
examination that the witness did not know what he wa1 
talking about. Counsel attempted to discredit l\Ir. Pal· 
mer's testimony but the trial court conectly held that 
the testimony and the basis therefor were before the jurr 
and it was for the jury to make of them what it would 
The factors utilized by an expert witness are alwa)'i 
subject of proper cross-examination to test the witnesi'! 
credibility. Cit.11 of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 20~ 
Kan. 689, 481 P.2d 950 ( 1971); the basis for and the 
weight to he given an expert's opinion should he left 
for the a(lYocates to challenge and for· the jury to d~ 
termine. Dolan t'. lllitchcll, 502 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1972) 
After blandly ignoring the record, appellants at· 
tempt to buttress their flimsy argument by castegatin~ 
both respondent's counsel and witness. This Court will 
not be swayed by such tactics and will look clos~ly to 
determine which siJe, if either, committed any unp~ 
. d k d hi ppraiser 1! priety. Counsel for respon ent as e s a . 
• • I" t d n additions.I bur the second transmission me crea e a 
... 
1e 
ft 
1~ 
prir 
:r ii 
b~ 
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den. ( 'f 2. p. I 0) , Appellant characterizes this question 
as being "in complete disregard of the prior ruling of 
the Court". ( Appcllauts' llrief', p. 11), and fmther, 
"Counsel's attempt to circumvent the Court's ruling by 
speaking in terms of injury or burden instead of dam-
age should not be countenanced by this Cowt". (Ap-
pellants' Brief, p. 12). It is clear that this question 
broached the issue of severance damages to elicit a re-
sponse from the appraiser as to his expert opinion on this 
issue. 
Hespomlcnt was properly given the opportunity to 
ask its witness if severance existed. This question was 
not in contravention of the court's ruling; it set the issue 
for the jury to determine. Appellants then attack the 
field investigation conducted by Mr. Palmer and char-
acterize it as "a mere recitation of counsel's instruc-
tions". (Appellants' Brief, p. 12). Besides being an af-
front to both counsel and witness, this allegation dis-
regards the record which shows that :Mr. Palmer visited 
the site on three separate occasions ( T2 Pg. 9). Mr. 
Palmer gave a comprehensive basis for his opinion on 
the severance issue. l\lr. Barlow, appellants' appraiser, 
parroted the landowners position and was obviously felt 
by the jury to be not worthy of belief. 
Appellants also allege that the trial court made a 
preliminary determination of the existence of severance 
damages. "Certainly the judge would not have ruled 
that damages could be recovered if he had not recog-
nized an injury or additional burden." (Appellants' 
14. 
lhief, pg. 11-12). This allegation is ridiculous. The trial 
court was always very careful to delineate t}11's · • . • • ' · ISSUe ano 
aclv1se ~he ~ury that it, the trier of fact, would make the 
cletermmahon as to whether appellants suffered an 
damages as a result of the activities of respondent. Se; 
Instruction No. 2 : "The burden of proving damages to 
the property that remains, if any, are burdens whicn 
the law places on the defendant landowners". (R. 56), 
Instruction No. 3: "Defendants are also entitled to 1~ 
cover the damages, if any, to that piece of land result· 
ing from the dimunition in its fair market value by 
reason of the erection of the tower and transmission 
lines across the tract". (lt. 57). Instruction No. 10: 
"Except as such damages have been stipulated you sha~ 
make awards in such amounts, if any, as you shall d~ 
termine under the evidence and the instructions given 
to you relative to the burden of proof". (R. 64). To 
eliminate any confusion on this point, the trial court 
gave an instruction specifically requested by respondent 
as Instruction No. 14: 
The fact that the con rt has instructed you con· 
ccrning damages is not to he taken as any in· 
dication that the Court either believes or does 
not believe that defendant landowners are en· 
titled to recover such damages. The instructi?ns 
in reference to damaaes are given as a guide 
in case vou find fro; a preponderance of the 
evidenc~ that the defendant landowners are en· 
titled to recover, as it is the Court's. duty : 
state to you fully all the law ap~hc~ble be 
this case, but should your determwation 
15 
that there should he no recovery, then you will 
entirely disregard the instructions given you 
upon the matter of damages. (R. 68). 
The testimony presented by l\lr. Palmer was rele-
nmt and material to the issues to be determined hy the 
trier of fact, l\I r. Palmer gave his reasons for finding 
no seYerance damage on the "Dix" parcel. To suggest 
that this te&timony should have been stricken would re-
quire this Court to find under the rationale of State 
Road Commission t'. Sillimrm, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d 
347 ( HW8), that the testimony was based upon such 
"palpable ignorance of the subject matter as to indi-
cate an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge 
in allowing the witness to express an opinion in the first 
place." No such fact exists I Respondent would submit 
that the trial court correctly and properly denied appel-
lants' motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Palmer. 
POINT II 
AS THE .JURY VEUDICT, AS IT RELAT-
ED TO THE "DIX" PAUCEL, WAS WITHIN 
THE UANGE OF COMPETENT 'rESTIMONY 
PRESENTED A TRIAL1 APPELLANTS' MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE DE-
NIED. 
Trial in this matter consumed two full days and 
involved the calling of five witnesses - two of whom 
were experts on land valuations. Both appellants and 
16 
respondent had full opportunity to present th . 
. . • · e1r re-
spective cases; the Jury hacl am1Jle o1Jporh1n"t to . 1y ~~ 
uate the testunony of each appraiser-thev ch t b 
1. • ose o e-i~ve .Mr. Palmer and rendered their verdict and the 
trrnl court entered its judgment thereon. Appellan~ 
have wholly failed to show any substantial basis forup-
s:ttin~ them. T~is Court has oft held that all presump-
tions mdulged m by it will favor the validity of botli 
such verdict and judgment. Ewell & Son, Inc. v. SaU 
Lalec City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 128o 
( 1U72). 
The trial court ruled on the claims of error here 
presented by appellants. It held .Mr. Palmer's testimony 
to be proper and not based upon any erroneous assump-
tion (R. 10.5). It held that no new trial should be given 
because of insufficiency of the evidence. (R. 92). The 
granting or denial of a motion for new trial is discre-
tionary with the trial court. This Court has recently re-
affirmed its position with regard to oven-uling the lower 
court on this issue: 
If reasonable minds could have found as the 
jury did in this case, from the eviden~e before 
it then we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' 
l\lotion for a New Trial on grounds of ins~f­
ficiencv of the evidence to support the verdict. 
Polles~he v. Transamerican Insurance Com-
pany, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 .(1972), 
citing llloscr v. Zions Co-op ftfercantile J111t., 
et al., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948). 
-
17 
See also U11frcrsal Investment v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 
2d a:w, 440 P .2d 564 ( 1965), and Gordon v. Provo 
City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391P.2d430 (1964). 
The appraisers called by each side indicated areas 
of agreement and areas of basic disagreement. They 
agreed specifically on the value of the land taken by 
respondent; both held the fair market value of the prop-
erty to be $2500 per acre. (Mr. Barlow at T, p. 74), 
( l\lr. Palmer at T2 p. 8). They disagreed as to the ef-
fect of the second power line on the "Dix" parcel, Mr. 
Palmer finding no severance damages and Mr. Barlow 
fletermining $13,000 in severance damages. The jury 
believed .Mr. Palmer. 
Hespondent woulcl submit that there has been no 
showing of any error committed by the trial court, let 
alone the substantial and prejudicial error required to 
he shown before this Court will reverse; nor has there 
been any indication that unfairness or injustice has rC4 
suited to appellants. There is no reasonable likelihood 
of any different result than that retumed by the jury 
and approved by the trial court if this cause were re-
manded. Appellants' Motion for a New Trial should 
be denied. Arnovitz v. Telfo_. 27 Utah 2d 261, 495 P.2d 
310, (1972). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have wholly failed to show any error 
committed hy the trial court or the trier of fact in this 
matter. The testimony of both appraisers was evaluated 
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by the jury and considered in their deliberations. Thert 
is no error upon which this Court could base a reversal 
of the trial court. Appellants' request for a new trial on 
the issue of damages should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LeROY S. AXLAND 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
